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NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FOURTH ESTATE IN  
A BRAVE NEW SOCIAL MEDIA WORLD 
 
*Peter Coe 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
For those working within security services, or operating as part of the media, whether 
that be as traditional journalist or broadcaster, or a blogger utilising social media, the 
myriad of laws and jurisprudence relating to how issues of national security, or 
terrorist activity, can be reported and disseminated, means navigating this area is both 
complex and challenging. This chapter aims to provide a road map to help to 
overcome some of these obstacles. It begins by considering the democratic function of 
the media, by virtue of its role as the ‘Fourth Estate’. In doing so, it takes a multi-
jurisdictional perspective, through recourse to a variety of international laws and 
jurisprudence. This acts as the foundation for the following sections, which provide 
analysis of the domestic and international legal principles and framework that the 
media are subject to, and operates within, when reporting on terrorist activity. Finally, 
the chapter considers how the print and broadcast media has reported terrorist activity 
in the past, and some of the problems that this has created. It concludes by analysing 
the changing media landscape, including the reasons for the demise of the traditional 
Fourth Estate, and the emergence, and ascendance, of citizen journalism, and an 
internet-based ‘Fifth Estate’. 
 
2. THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE: A MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
ON THE PURPOSE OF THE MEDIA AS THE ‘FOURTH ESTATE’  
 
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), interprets 
Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to provide 
extended protection of the media, even in the absence of express provisions to that 
effect1. Thus, individuals and entities operating as part of the media enjoy a privileged 
position within the civil liberties matrix, as they are beneficiaries of the right to media 
                                                        
* Lecturer in Law, Aston University; Barrister, East Anglian Chambers. 
1 For example, see: Vejdeland and others v Sweden [2012] ECHR 242, [12]; Jersild v Denmark (1995) 
19 EHRR 1, [31]; Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v Norway (2000) 29 EHRR 125, [63]; Bergens Tidande 
v Norway (2001) 31 EHRR 16, [57]; Thorgeir Thorgeirson v Iceland (1992) 14 EHRR 843, [67]; 
Oberschlick v Austria (No 2) (1998) 25 EHRR 357, [33]; Prager and Oberschlick v Austria (1995) 21 
EHRR 1, [38]; Thoma v Luxembourg (2003) 36 EHRR 21, [45]-[46]; R. Clayton QC and H. Tomlinson 
QC, Privacy and Freedom of Expression (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2010), 271 [15.254]. 
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freedom2. This right provides protection for ‘media communication’ over and above 
that afforded to non-media, pursuant to the right to freedom of expression3. So, why 
does ‘media’ occupy this special position? 
 
The contribution of the media to democracy is well documented. It has been 
observed, both within the UK and internationally, that as well as being a ‘public 
educator’4, as ‘the Fourth Estate’5, the primary function of the media is to act as a 
‘public watchdog’,6 in that it operates as the general public’s ‘eyes and ears’ by 
investigating and reporting abuses of power7. The media’s role within democratic 
society manifests in its dissemination of information and ideas, and its facilitation of 
political debate and discourse on general issues of public interest8, including terrorist 
activity, and in enabling the public’s right to receive this information 9 . This is 
reflected in the work of Blasi, who is a leading proponent of the movement that posits 
the media as a ‘checking function’ 10 . Blasi regards the media as a protected 
                                                        
2 The special position of the media in relation to the freedom of expression has been recognised by 
commentators such Stewart J, Bezanson and West. See: P. Stewart J, ‘Or of the Press’, (1975) 26 
Hastings Law Journal 705, 707; R.P. Bezanson, ‘The New Free Press Guarantee’ (1977) 63 Virginia 
Law Review 731, 733; S.R. West, ‘Awakening the Press Clause’ (2011) 58 UCLA Law Review 1025, 
1032. 
3 For further discussion on a distinct right to media freedom, see: P. Coe, ‘Redefining ‘media’ using a 
‘media-as-a-constitutional-component’ concept: An evaluation of the need for the European Court of 
Human Rights to alter its understanding of ‘media’ within a new media landscape’, Legal Studies; E. 
Barendt, Freedom of Speech, (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2005), ch. 12. 
4 In the UK see: McCartan Turkington Breen (A Firm) v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 277, [19]; 
For ECtHR jurisprudence, see: Bergens Tidande v Norway (2001) 31 EHRR 16, [49]; For the US, see: 
Mills v Alabama (1966) 384 US 214, 219; Cox Broadcasting v Cohn (1975) 420 US 469, 492; See 
generally: A. Lewis, ‘Journalists and the First Amendment’ in D. Kingsford-Smith and D. Oliver (eds), 
Economical with the Truth: The Law and the Media in a Democratic Society, (ECS Publishing Ltd, 
1990), 1-7; D. Milo, Defamation and Freedom of Speech, (Oxford University Press, 2008), 83. 
5 P. Stewart J, ‘Or of the Press’, (1975) 26 Hastings Law Journal 705, 708 
6 The Observer and The Guardian v United Kingdom (1991) 14 EHRR 153, [59]; Goodwin v United 
Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 123, [39]; Thorgeirson v Iceland (1992) 14 EHRR 843, [63]; Bladet 
Tromso and Stensaas v Norway (2000) 29 EHRR 125, [62]; Bergens Tidende v Norway (2001) 31 
EHRR 16 [49]. 
7 A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 183 per Sir John Donaldson MR; See 
also: E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech, (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2005), 418 
8 Lingens v Austria (186) 8 EHRR 103, [26]; Oberschlick v Austria (No 1) (1991) 19 EHRR 389, [58]; 
Castells v Spain (1992) 14 EHRR 445, [43]; Thorgeir Thorgeirson v Iceland (1992) 14 EHRR 843; 
Jersild v Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1, [31]; United Communist Party of Turkey and others v Turkey 
[1998] App. no. 133/1996/752/951 [44]. 
9 Article 10 ECHR includes the right to receive as well as impart information. In London Regional 
Transport v Mayor of London [2001] EWCA Civ 1491, [55], Sedley LJ described the right to receive 
information as ‘the lifeblood of democracy’. See also: Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 
EHRR 245, [65]; Fressoz and Roire v France (2001) 31 EHRR 2, [51]; Bergens Tidande v Norway 
(2001) 31 EHRR 16, [52]. 
10 V.A. Blasi, ‘The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory’ (1977) American Bar Foundation 
Research Journal, 521; V.A. Blasi, ‘Journalistic Autonomy as a First Amendment Concept’ in R.H. 
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participant in the system of checks and balances inherent in democratic 
governments11. Consequently, investigative journalism, that is, ‘finding out what is 
really going on in society’12, is critical to the operation of democracy13. Thus, in 
Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd14, Lord Nicholls stated that a modern function of 
the media is investigative journalism: ‘[t]his activity, as much as the traditional 
activities of reporting and commenting, is part of the vital role of the press and the 
media generally’. 15  More recently, Leveson LJ in his Inquiry into the Culture, 
Practices and Ethics of the Press (Inquiry)16, recognised that, in recent years, the 
media, and in particular the press, has played a critical role in informing the public on 
matters of public interest and concern17. This democratic function, and the extended 
privileges afforded to the media, has been endorsed within a number of different 
jurisdictions and arenas. For instance, the ECtHR has attached great importance to the 
role of the media18, and has been particularly vocal in championing media freedom, 
within limits, to ensure that the media can fulfill this vital purpose: 
 
‘Although the press19 must not overstep certain bounds, in particular in 
respect of the reputation and rights of others, its duty is nevertheless to 
impart – in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities – 
information and ideas on all matters of public interest. Not only does the 
press have the task of imparting such information and ideas; the public 
                                                                                                                                                              
Keller Jr (ed), In Honour of Justice Douglas” A Symposium on Individual Freedom and Government, 
(Greenwood Press, 1979) 55, 68 
11 Blasi, ‘Journalistic Autonomy’, ibid. 69; See also: R. Hargreaves, The First Freedom: A History of 
Free Speech, (Sutton Publishing, 2002), 305. 
12 A. Belsey, ‘Journalism and Ethics: Can they Co-exist?’ in M. Kieran, Media Ethics, (Routledge, 
1998), 1, 5. 
13 D. Milo, Defamation and Freedom of Speech, (Oxford University Press, 2008), 82 
14 [2001] 2 AC 127. 
15 ibid. 200. 
16 Lord Justice Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press, November 
2012 
17 ibid. 455-470 
18 For example, see: Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v Norway (2000) 29 EHRR 125, [59]; Bergens 
Tidande v Norway (2001) 31 EHRR 16, [48]; Busuioc v Moldova (2006) 42 EHRR 14, [64]-[65]; 
Jersild v Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1; Janowski v Poland (No 1) (2000) 29 EHRR 705, [32]. 
19 The jurisprudence of the ECtHR has determined that the protection afforded to the press extends to 
audiovisual media: Jersild v Denmark [1994] App. no. 15890/89 [31]; Radio France and others v 
France [2004] App. no. 53984/00 [33] 
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also has a right to receive them. Were it otherwise, the press would be 
unable to play its vital role of ‘public watchdog’20. 
 
Consequently, according to the Strasbourg Court, the media ‘affords the public one of 
the best means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of 
political leaders. It is incumbent on the press to impart information and ideas on 
political issues and on other subjects of public interest’21. 
 
 In the context of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the Human Rights Committee (HRC) has also recognised the media’s 
importance to the operation of democracy. For instance, in Bodrožić v Serbia and 
Montenegro the Committee stated that ‘in circumstances of public debate in a 
democratic society, especially in the media, concerning figures in the political 
domain, the value placed by the Covenant upon uninhibited expression is particularly 
high’22. Further, in Marques de Morais v Angola23, the Committee endorsed the role 
of the media in giving effect to Article 25 ICCPR, which provides for the right to take 
part in the conduct of public affairs24 . Although not relating to the ICCPR, this 
endorsement by the Committee of the public affairs function of the media assimilates 
closely with Lord Bingham’s judgment in the House of Lords’ case of McCartan 
Turkington Breen (A Firm) v Times Newspapers Ltd25, in which he stated: 
 
‘But the majority cannot participate in the public life of their society in 
these ways if they are not alerted to and informed about matters which call 
or may call for consideration and action. It is very largely through the 
media, including of course the press, that they will be so alerted and 
                                                        
20 Axel Springer AG v Germany (No. 1) [2012] App. no. 39954/08 [79]; Von Hannover v Germany (No. 
2) [2012] App. nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08 [102]. See further: Sunday Times v United Kingdom (No. 
1) [1979] App. no. 6538/74 [65]; Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v Norway [1999] App. no. 21980/93 
[62]; Times Newspapers Ltd v United Kingdom (Nos. 1 and 2) [2009] App. nos. 3002/03 and 23676/03 
[40]. 
21 Centro Europa 7 Srl and Di Stefano v Italy [2012] App. no. 38433/09 [131]; Lingens v Austria 
[1986] App. no. 9815/82; Sürek v Turkey (No. 1) [1999] App. no. 26682/95 [59]; Thoma v Luxembourg 
[2001] App. no. 38432/97 [45]. 
22 HRC, Bodrožić v Serbia and Montenegro [2005] Communications no. 1180/2003 [7.2]. 
23 [2005] Communication no. 1128/2002 [6.8] 
24 See also: General Comment no. 25, [25] 
25 [2001] 2 AC 277 
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informed. The proper functioning of a modern participatory democracy 
requires that the media be free, active, professional and inquiring’.26 
 
Further afield, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has 
stated that the media plays a critical role in exercising the ‘social dimension’ of 
freedom of expression in a democracy27. According to the Court, journalists ‘keep 
society informed’ and play an ‘indispensible’ role in enabling ‘society to enjoy full 
freedom’28. Consequently, journalism ‘is one of the most important manifestations of 
freedom of expression and information’29.  In the South African case of Khumalo v 
Holomisa 30  the Constitutional Court held that in a democracy the media ‘are 
important agents in ensuring that government is open, responsive and accountable to 
the people.’31 The media is also obliged to provide citizens with information and with 
‘a platform for the exchange of ideas which is crucial to the development of a 
democratic culture.’32  In the US, Black J, in the Supreme Court case of Mills v 
Alabama33, stated: ‘the press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote 
to any abuses of power by government officials and as a constitutionally chosen 
means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom 
they were selected to serve.’34 
 
Media freedom, freedom of expression and democracy are inextricably and 
intrinsically linked with each other, as the media is an important democratic cog 
within society.  However, as will be discussed later in this chapter, in recent years, 
there has, arguably, been a ‘shift’ in the focus of the traditional media, that is, the 
press and broadcasting industry. Consequently, citizen journalism, through social 
media, has taken on some of the ‘democratic responsibilities’ previously associated 
                                                        
26 ibid. [19] 
27 Fontevecchia and D’Amico v Argentina [2011] Case 12.524 [44]; Ivcher-Bronstein v Peru [2001] 
Case 11.762 [149]; Herrera-Ulloa v Costa Rica [2004] Case 12.367 [117] 
28 Ivcher-Bronstein v Peru [2001] Case 11.762 [150]; Herrera-Ulloa v Costa Rica [2004] Case 12.367 
[119] 
29 IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 [71]; IAComHR, Hugo Bustios Saavedra v Peru [1997] Case 
10.548 [71]; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression with the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, Inter-American Legal Framework Regarding the Right to Freedom of 
Expression, 2009, CIDH/RELE/INF. 2/09, para. 165 
30 (2002) (5) SA 401 (CC) 
31 ibid. [23] 
32 ibid. [24] 
33 (1966) 384 US 214  
34 ibid. 219; See also: Cox Broadcasting v Cohn (1975) 420 US 469, 492. 
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with the ‘Fourth Estate’, including the reporting of terrorist activity. Before this is 
considered, the following section will look at how the media’s role as the Fourth 
Estate interacts with the legal framework relating to the reporting of terrorist activity. 
 
3. REPORTING ON TERRORISM: LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND 
FRAMEWORK 
 
The principles of freedom of expression and media freedom afford wide-ranging 
protection to both individuals and the media. It will come as no surprise that both 
protect the dissemination of information and ideas that are inoffensive or ‘popular’. 
However, the ambit of these principles goes much further as, according to the ECtHR, 
they also provide protection for expression that may ‘offend, shock or disturb the state 
or any sector of the population’35. Media freedom is, therefore, founded on the notion 
that liberal discussion on matters of public interest and concern is more conducive to 
the operation of democracy than the suppression of expression that may be offensive, 
shocking, disturbing or unpopular 36 . However, despite the protection that media 
freedom can provide, the media is still obliged to exercise its democratic function 
within a complex legal framework relating to the reporting of public order interests, 
including, terrorist activity. Thus, very often, a balance has to be struck between, what 
can be, conflicting interests. 
 
A. THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN PROTECTING ‘PUBLIC ORDER’ 
 
In Sürek v Turkey (No. 2 and No. 3) and Incal v Turkey37 the ECtHR stated that, 
because the government is in a dominant position when it comes to public discourse, 
it has to refrain from interfering with media freedom via governmental channels of 
communication38. Despite this, the Court made it clear in both Sürek cases, and in 
Incal, that in order for ‘competent’ government authorities to effectively exercise 
their function as guarantors of public order, they must be able to adopt measures 
which allow them to appropriately, and without excess, deal with remarks, which 
                                                        
35 Handyside v United Kingdom A 24 (1976); 1 EHRR 737, [49]; See also, Éditions Plon v. France 
App. No 58184/00 ECHR 2004-IV, [42]-[43] 
36 J. Oster, Media Freedom as a Fundamental Right, (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 193.  
37  (No. 2) [1999] App. no. 24122/94; (No. 3) [1999] App. no. 24735/94; Incal [1998] App. no. 
41/1997/825/1031. 
38 ibid. (No. 2) [34]; (No. 3) [37]; Incal [54]. 
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themselves threaten public order, by exceeding the boundaries of civilised 
discourse39, regardless of whether those remarks emanate from the media or non-
media. The jurisprudence from Strasbourg reflects the qualifications imposed by 
Article 10(2) ECHR on the Article 10(1) right to freedom of expression. Pursuant to 
Article 10(2), freedom of expression (and media freedom) can be legitimately 
interfered with ‘in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety’ and for the ‘prevention of disorder or crime’. Consequently, the ECtHR has 
consistently re-stated that the media must not exceed the boundaries set, inter alia, 
‘for the protection of vital interests of the State, such as the protection of national 
security or territorial integrity against the threat of violence or the prevention of 
disorder or crime’. 40  This position is mirrored by other international laws. For 
instance, Articles 19(3)(b) and 13(2)(b) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) 
respectively, allow freedom of expression to be restricted to protect national security 
or public order. Similarly, the HRC and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (AfComHPR) have stated that freedom of expression can be 
legitimately restricted to safeguard and strengthen national unity under challenging 
political circumstances41, and Article 27(2) of the African Charter on Human Rights 
states that each individual’s rights and freedoms shall be exercised ‘with due regard to 
collective security…and common interest42’.  
 
 So, what does ‘public order’ mean, and does it cover, for instance, the 
dissemination or reporting of, terrorist speech? According to scholars such as Grote 
and Wenzel, the notion of ‘public order’ includes the preservation of fundamental 
interests required by the State to guarantee public safety and to protect the interests of 
                                                        
39 ibid. 
40 Sürek v Turkey (No. 1) [1999] App. no. 26682/95 [59]; Şener v Turkey [2000] App. no. 26680/95 
[41]; Özgür Gündem v Turkey [2000] App. no. 23144/93 [58]. 
41 HRC: Mukong v Cameroon [1994] Communication no. 458/91 [9.7]; AfComHPR: Article 19 v 
Eritrea [2007] App. no. 275/03 [108]. 
42 As observed by Oster, although ‘public order’ is not expressly referred to within Article 27(2), it is 
included in the term ‘common interest’: J. Oster, Media Freedom as a Fundamental Right, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 193. Oster compares: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
Media Rights Agenda, Constitutional Rights Project, Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights 
Project v Nigeria [1998] App. nos. 105/93, 128/94, 130/94 and 152/96 [73]; Constitutional Rights 
Project, Civil Liberties and Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria [1999] App. nos. 140/94, 141/94 and 
145/95 [43]; Scanlen & Holderness v Zimbabwe [2009] App. no. 297/05 [109]. 
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society generally43. Similarly, the IACtHR has interpreted public order to mean ‘the 
conditions that assure the normal and harmonious functioning of [democratic] 
institutions based on a coherent system of values and principles’.44 The ECtHR has 
recognised that the concept of ‘order’ includes, inter alia, order in the public sphere, 
such as on public streets and in public places45. According to the jurisprudence of the 
Court, the ‘prevention of crime’ justification, pursuant to Article 10(2) is, in essence, 
inherent within public order46, which includes the prevention of specific criminal 
offences, the deterrence and control of crime generally, as well as the investigation of 
crimes that have, allegedly, already been committed 47 . Therefore, public order 
encompasses expression related to terrorist activity.  
 
There is an inextricable link between freedom of expression, media freedom, 
public order and democracy. As a result, public order does not just legitimise 
interference with freedom of expression 48 . The concept, equally, ‘requires the 
broadest possible circulation of information, opinions, news and ideas – that is the 
maximum degree of exercise of freedom of expression’. 49  Thus, pursuant to a 
multitude of international laws, such as those discussed above, if a democratic state is 
concerned that public order could be threatened by discourse or the communication of 
information or ideas relating to, for instance, terrorism, the dissemination of that 
expression can be restricted. However, any such restriction of freedom of expression 
and media freedom, justified on the grounds of public order concerns, must be 
interpreted to conform strictly to the demands of a democratic society 50  and, 
consequently, must ‘be based on real and objectively verifiable causes that present the 
certain and credible threat of a potentially serious disturbance of the basic conditions 
                                                        
43 R. Grote and N. Wenzel, ‘Meinungsfreiheit’, in T. Marauhn and R. Grote (eds.), EMRK/GG 
Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz, (2nd ed. Mohr Siebeck, 
2013), [85]; J. Oster, Media Freedom as a Fundamental Right, (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 
194. 
44 IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 [64]. 
45 Chorherr v Austria [1993] App. no. 13308/87 [28]. 
46 J. Oster, Media Freedom as a Fundamental Right, (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 196. 
47 Orban and others v France [2009] App. no. 20985/05 [42]. 
48 J. Oster, Media Freedom as a Fundamental Right, (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 194-195. 
49 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression with the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, Inter-American Legal Framework Regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression, 
2009, CIDH/RELE/INF. 2/09 [81]; IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 [69]; AfComHPR, Scanlen & 
Holderness v Zimbabwe [2009] App. no. 297/05 [109]. 
50 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression with the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, Inter-American Legal Framework Regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression, 
2009, CIDH/RELE/INF. 2/09 [80]. 
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for the functioning of democratic institutions’. 51  Accordingly, ‘[m]ere conjecture 
regarding possible disturbances of public order, nor hypothetical circumstances…that 
do not clearly present a reasonable threat of serious disturbances’ are insufficient to 
warrant interference with media freedom52.   
  
B. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
 
The public order and inherent prevention of disorder or crime rationales, that can 
provide legitimate justification for the interference with the rights to freedom of 
expression and media freedom, have become particularly important in relation to the 
restriction of publications, as well as orders to reveal journalistic sources for, inter 
alia, reasons pertaining to the fight against terrorism53. By virtue of its status as a 
Member State of, for instance, the UN Security Council, Council of Europe and the 
European Union, there are a number of international legal instruments that apply to 
the UK and its citizens in respect to terrorism, and the reporting of terrorist activity. 
However, the application of these laws are subject to certain overarching principles 
pertaining to the operation of a democratic state, including the rights to freedom of 
expression and media freedom, that require a balance to be struck. The ECtHR and 
HRC have recognised that, on the one hand, the media has a right and duty, as the 
Fourth Estate, to ‘convey information and ideas on political issues, even divisive 
ones’54 and both inform the public on measures prescribed by the state to maintain 
public order, and prevent crime, including terrorism, and form public opinion on such 
activities. On the other hand, democracies have a right to defend themselves against 
abuses directed at the very democratic values that underpin them.55 Consequently, the 
jurisprudence of both the HRC and the ECtHR has affirmed that a broad margin of 
appreciation should be afforded to Member State authorities 56  ‘to adopt, in their 
capacity as guarantors of public order, measures, even of a criminal-law nature, 
intended to react appropriately and with out excess to [remarks that] incite to violence 
                                                        
51 ibid. [82].  
52 ibid.  
53 J. Oster, Media Freedom as a Fundamental Right, (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 196. 
54 ECtHR: Özgür Gündem v Turkey [2000] App. no. 23144/93 [58]; Şener v Turkey [2000] App. no. 
26680/95 [41]; HRC, General Comment no. 34 [46]. 
55 J. Oster, Media Freedom as a Fundamental Right, (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 198. 
56 ibid. 
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against an individual or a public official or a sector of the population’.57 Therefore, a 
rather delicate ‘balance’ has to be struck by state authorities to determine whether 
proposed measures to protect, for example, national security against threats of 
terrorism, are suitable. To do this, the authorities embark upon careful analysis of the 
respective situation, and attempt to predict how it may develop. As a result, there is 
always a high degree of factual uncertainty with this exercise. In applying the margin 
of appreciation, the courts will decide whether the aims of the state’s authorities 
justify any potential interference with countervailing civil liberties, and that they do 
not disproportionately impact upon other fundamental democratic rights, such as 
freedom of expression and media freedom58. Indeed, according to the ECtHR in Klass 
and others v Germany59, states are not permitted to adopt whatever measures they see 
fit, even to deal with terrorism: states may not undermine, or even destroy democracy, 
on the premise of defending it60. 
 
This ‘balancing act’, and the HRC and Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence, is 
reflected by other international laws. According to its preamble, UN Security Council 
Resolution 1624 (2005) condemns ‘in the strongest terms the incitement of terrorist 
acts and [repudiates] attempts at the justification or glorification (apologie) of terrorist 
acts that may incite further terrorist acts’. Article 1(a) of the Resolution ‘[c]alls upon 
all States to adopt such measures as may be necessary and appropriate and in 
accordance with their obligations under international law to prohibit by law 
incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts’.61 However, the Resolution also refers to 
the right to freedom of expression, pursuant to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and Article 19 ICCPR, and ‘that any restrictions thereon shall only 
be such as are provided by law and are necessary on the grounds set out in [Article 
19(3) ICCPR].  
 
                                                        
57 ECtHR: Sürek v Turkey (No. 1) [1999] App. no. 26682/95 [61]; Şener v Turkey [2000] App. no. 
26680/95 [40]; Erdoğdu v Turkey [2000] App. no. 25723/94 [62]; HRC: A.K. and A.R. v Uzbekistan 
[2009] Communication no. 1233/2003 [7.2]. 
58 J. Oster, Media Freedom as a Fundamental Right, (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 198-199. 
59 [1978] App. no. 5029/71. 
60 ibid. [49] 
61 Resolution 1624 (2005), Adopted by the Security Council at its 5261st meeting, on 14th September 
2005, S/RES/1624 (2005). Oster argues that, pursuant to the Resolution’s preamble, Article 1 does not, 
therefore, require States to adopt measures to prohibit justification or glorification or terrorist acts: J. 
Oster, Media Freedom as a Fundamental Right, (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 196. 
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Other international instruments, including the Council of Europe Convention on 
the Prevention of Terrorism (CECPT) and the EU Framework Decision (EUFD) on 
Combating Terrorism 62 , mirror the Resolution. Article 5(2) of the Convention 
requires Member States to prosecute, as a criminal offence, ‘public provocation to 
commit a terrorist offence’. Pursuant to Article 5(1), this entails ‘the distribution, or 
otherwise making available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the 
commission of a terrorist offence, where such conduct, whether or not directly 
advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such offence may be 
committed’. Similarly, Article 4(1) EUFD states that Member States must implement 
the necessary measures to ensure that inciting or aiding or abetting terrorist offences 
proscribed under Articles 2 and 3 are made punishable. In the same vein as Article 
1(a) of Resolution 1624, Article 4(1) is also qualified by the EUFD itself. Recital 10 
of the EUFD states that nothing in the Framework Decision may be interpreted as 
being intended to reduce or restrict fundamental rights or freedoms, including 
freedom of expression. Further, Article 2 of Recital 14 of the Framework Decision, 
amending the EUFD63, states that it: 
 
‘…shall not have the effect of requiring Member States to take measures 
in contradiction of fundamental principles relating to freedom of 
expression, in particular freedom of the press and the freedom of 
expression in other media as they result from constitutional traditions or 
rules governing the rights and responsibilities of, and the procedural 
guarantees for, the press or other media where these rules relate to the 
determination of limitation of liability.’ 
 
Despite this apparent appetite to strike a balance between the adoption of 
measures to protect state security and the need to ensure that the right to freedom of 
expression and media freedom are not disproportionately interfered with, in both 
Purcell and others v Ireland64 and Brind and others v United Kingdom65 the European 
                                                        
62 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism, OJ 2002, 
L164/3, amended by Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on Combating Terrorism, OJ 2002, L330/21. 
63 Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28th November 2008 amending Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA on Combating Terrorism, OJ 2008, L330/21. 
64 [1991] App. no. 15404/89. 
65 [1994] App. no. 18714/91. 
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Commission of Human Rights (EComHR), allowed restrictions to be imposed on 
certain media organisations, in relation to their dissemination of speech associated 
with terrorist activity in Northern Ireland. In Purcell journalists and producers of 
radio and television programmes, employed by Radio Telfis Eireann, were instructed, 
pursuant to a ministerial Order issued under s31 of the Broadcasting Act 1961, to 
refrain from broadcasting any interview, or report of an interview, with spokesmen 
for the IRA or Sinn Fėin. The EComHR found that such restrictions might cause the 
applicants (who also included broadcasting trade unions) ‘inconvenience in the 
exercise of their professional duties’.66 However, despite this, it did not find that 
Article 10(1) was disproportionately interfered with, as live statements could ‘involve 
a special risk of coded messages being conveyed, a risk which even conscientious 
journalists cannot control within the exercise of the professional judgment’.67 Brind 
also involved applicants employed as journalists and producers of radio and television 
programmes, as well as editors and presenters. It related to a request made by the 
British Home Department for the BBC and Independent Broadcasting Authority to 
broadcast a statement made by a representative of terrorist organisations, including 
Sinn Fėin, Republican Sinn Fėin and the Ulster Defence Association, only with a 
voice-over account spoken by an actor. The government’s reason for this was to limit 
the impact and influence any such statements would have on the supporters of 
terrorist organisations in the UK. The Commission held that there was no violation of 
Article 10(1) as the ‘limited extent of the interference’ with the applicants’ rights was 
not, in this instance, disproportionate to the measures imposed to effectively deal with 
the threat of terrorist activity.  
 
It is perfectly reasonable to expect that states do not want to provide a ‘soap box’ 
for the dissemination of terrorist ideology or coded messages. However, this has to be 
balanced with the media’s right to inform the public as to potential threats to public 
order, and the public’s right to be informed, to enable decisions to be made on how to 
react68. Oster argues that ‘a sweeping concession to the Convention States as in Brind 
constitutes a severe obstacle to public discourse on a matter of paramount importance 
to society’. Instead, he advocates, that rather than such a severe ‘paternalistic’ 
                                                        
66 Purcell, 17 
67 ibid.  
68 J. Oster, Media Freedom as a Fundamental Right, (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 200. 
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approach, a case-by-case analysis should be adopted.69 This correlates closely with 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, which has suggested that such analysis would be 
based on whether the words used and the context within which they were written 
could incite criminal (including terrorist) activity or include coded messages70. Oster 
goes on to state that, if such an approach were to be adopted, ‘a publisher cannot be 
exonerated from any liability for the content of the third-party statements’.71 This is 
because the Strasbourg Court has determined that a publisher is subject to the ‘duties 
and responsibilities’ of journalists in how they accumulate, and then communicate, 
information to the public. Accordingly, these ‘duties and responsibilities’ become 
even more significant during times of conflict and tension72. Consequently, it was 
held by the ECtHR in Özgür Gündem v Turkey73 that ‘the fact that interviews or 
statements were given by a member of a proscribed organization cannot in itself 
justify an interference with the newspaper’s freedom of expression. Nor can the fact 
that the interviews or statements contain views strongly disparaging of government 
policy’.74 
 
Because of its position as the Fourth Estate, and the special duties and 
responsibilities this bestows upon the media, those operating as part of the media are 
under an obligation not to advocate the use of violence, glorify war, or intend to 
stigmatise one side of the conflict75. In relation to situations where it is alleged the 
media has actually ‘advocated’ terrorist activity, according to the HRC, offences such 
as ‘encouragement of terrorism’76, ‘extremist activity’77 and ‘praising’, ‘glorifying’ or 
‘justifying’ terrorism, should be unequivocally defined to ensure that they do not 
                                                        
69 ibid. 
70 Sürek v Turkey (No. 1) [1999] App. no. 26682/95 [63]; Şener v Turkey [2000] App. no. 26680/95 
[44ff]; Özgür Gündem v Turkey [2000] App. no. 23144/93 [63], [65]; Sürek and Özdemir v Turkey 
[1999] App. nos. 23927/94 and 24277/94 [61]. 
71 J. Oster, Media Freedom as a Fundamental Right, (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 200. 
72 Sürek v Turkey (No. 1) [1999] App. no. 26682/95 [63]; Şener v Turkey [2000] App. no. 26680/95 
[42]. 
73 The case related to dissemination by the newspaper, Özgür Gündem, of statements made by alleged 
terrorists. In this instance, it concerned declarations of PKK-related organisations and an interview 
with Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader. 
74 [2000] App. no. 23144/93 [63]. 
75 Sürek v Turkey (No. 1) [1999] App. no. 26682/95 [62]; Sürek v Turkey (No. 3) [1999] App. no. 
24735/94 [40]; Özgür Gündem v Turkey [2000] App. no. 23144/93 [70]; Balsytė-Lideikienė v Lithuania 
[2008] App. no. 72596/01 [79]. 
76 HRC, Concluding observations on the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
(CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6), [26]. 
77 HRC, Concluding observations on the Russian Federation (CCPR/CO/79/RUS), [20]. 
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unnecessarily and disproportionately interfere with freedom of expression and media 
freedom, but rather they fully accord with the requirement of being ‘proscribed by 
law’.78 The HRC has also made it clear that states must be able to specify exactly the 
details of the threat posed for national security if the publisher were to exercise its 
right to media freedom.79 Thus, the Committee has held that ‘to muzzle advocacy of 
multi-party democracy, democratic tenets and human rights’ may not be justified even 
when legitimate objectives of national security or public order are concerned.80 
 
C. A VIEW FROM THE UK PART 1: DAVID MIRANDA, GLENN 
GREENWALD, EDWARD SNOWDEN AND THE TERRORISM ACT 2000  
 
The UK’s media are subject to the international laws and incorporated principles set 
out in the previous section. In addition, the legal matrix within which our domestic 
media operates includes the Terrorism Acts 2000, which has impacted upon both the 
media’s right to protect the confidentiality of its sources, pursuant to media freedom, 
and the role of the UK’s security services81. A recent, and high profile, example of 
jurisprudence relating to the media’s interaction with the 2000 Act is the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in R (David Miranda) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Liberty, Article 19, English 
Pen and the Media Legal Defence Initiative82. The case concerned consideration of, 
inter alia, section 1(1) and (2) and paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 7 of the 2000 Act, and 
Article 10(1) ECHR. Section 1(1) and (2), when read together, define terrorism as: (i) 
the use or threat of action which (ii) endangers a person's life, other than that of the 
person committing the action where (iii) the use of threat is designed to influence the 
government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public 
or a section of the public and (iv) the use or threat is made for the purpose of 
                                                        
78 HRC, General Comment no. 34, [46]. 
79 Park v Republic of Korea [1998] Communication no. 628/1995 [10.3]; Kim v Republic of Korea 
[1999] Communication no. 574/1994 [12.4]; Shin v Republic of Korea [2004] Communication no. 
926/2000 [7.2]. 
80 Mukong v Cameroon [1994] Communication no. 458/91 [9.7]; See also, AfComHPR: Article 19 v 
Eritrea [2007] App. no. 275/03 [108]. 
81 Please note that the Terrorism Act 2006 also contains provisions that may impact upon the media 
(see, for instance: section 1, which relates to the encouragement of terrorism, and its allied provisions). 
These provisions are discussed in more detail below. 
82 [2016] EWCA Civ 6. 
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advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.83 Pursuant to paragraph 
2(1) of Schedule 7, a police officer has the power to stop and question a person at a 
port or border area for the purpose of determining whether they appear to be 
‘concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism’.  
 
The appellant, David Miranda, is the husband of Glenn Greenwald, a 
journalist who, at the time, was working for the Guardian newspaper. In late 2012 
Greenwald and another journalist, Laura Poitras, met Edward Snowden. Snowden 
provided the pair with encrypted data that had been stolen from the US National 
Security Agency. In addition, the data included UK intelligence material. Some of this 
material formed the basis of a number of articles published by the Guardian. On 12th 
August 2013 Miranda travelled from Rio de Janeiro to Berlin to meet Poitras. He was 
carrying encrypted material deriving from data obtained by Snowden, and was tasked 
with collecting computer drives containing further material to assist Greenwald’s 
journalistic activity. The UK Security Service were aware of Miranda’s movements 
and, as a result, issued a Port Circulation Sheet informing counter-terrorism police 
that Miranda was knowingly carrying material, the release of which would endanger 
lives, and that the disclosure or threat of disclosure was designed to influence a 
government and was made for the ‘purpose of promoting a political or ideological 
cause’. The police were satisfied that sufficient information had been provided by the 
Security Service to allow a lawful Schedule 7 stop to take place. Consequently, on the 
18th of August Miranda was stopped by counter-terrorism police officers at Heathrow 
airport, whilst travelling to Rio de Janeiro, and subsequently questioned by them.84 It 
is important to note at this juncture that, at the time of being stopped, Miranda did not 
identify himself as a journalist (as he is not a journalist), or state that he was carrying 
‘journalistic material’. Miranda issued judicial review proceedings. It is the decision 
of the High Court of the Divisional Court85 that is the subject of the appeal86. Miranda 
submitted that the acts of the police were unlawful for the following reasons: Firstly, 
the Schedule 7 stop was exercised for a purpose that was not permitted by the 2000 
Act. Secondly, the use of the power contravened Article 10 ECHR. Thirdly, in 
relation to journalistic material, Schedule 7 is incompatible with Article 10.  
                                                        
83 ibid. [39] per Lord Dyson MR. 
84 ibid. [6]-[20] per Lord Dyson MR. 
85 [2014] EWHC 255 (Admin) per Laws LJ. 
86 The leading judgment was given by Lord Dyson MR, with who Richards LJ and Floyd LJ agreed. 
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The Court of Appeal rejected the High Court’s literal interpretation of the 
definition of terrorism, pursuant to section 1(1) and (2).  Instead, the court held that 
Parliament must have intended for the provision to import a mental element to the 
definition of terrorism. This means that a defendant must intend that, or be reckless as 
to whether, the material that is published has the effect of endangering life or creating 
a serious risk to the health or safety of the public, or a section of the public87. Thus, in 
order for publication of material to amount to terrorism, the publication must satisfy 
the section 1(1) test, as follows: Firstly, the defendant intended that, or was reckless 
as to whether, the publication of the material would endanger life or create a serious 
risk to the health or safety of the public, or a section thereof; Secondly, the defendant 
intends the publication of the material to influence the government or an international 
governmental organisation or to intimidate the public, or a section thereof; Thirdly, 
publication of the material is for the  purpose of advancing, inter alia, a political or 
ideological cause. In Miranda’s case, the court held that the police were entitled to 
consider that material in his possession might be released in circumstances falling 
within the definition of terrorism, and this possibility was sufficient to justify the stop 
and detention88. The court noted that Parliament has set this bar at ‘quite a low level’, 
but held that the stop and detainment of Miranda was the type of police/security 
activity that Parliament intended when drafting the Act89. 
 
The court further rejected that the use of the Schedule 7 power was, in this 
instance, an unjustified and disproportionate interference with a journalist’s enhanced 
right to freedom of expression, pursuant to media freedom. This was on the basis that 
compelling national security interests outweighed Miranda’s Article 10(1) rights. 
Although the court held that the police should have known Miranda’s material ‘was or 
might have been journalistic material’90, there was, according to the court, no reason 
to disagree with the Security Services’ assessment that the material seized contained 
information that posed a risk to national security. Indeed, challenging such an 
assessment would be ‘very difficult…in a court of law’91. Lord Dyson concluded by 
                                                        
87 [2016] EWCA Civ 6 [53]-[55]. 
88 ibid. [57]-[58].  
89 ibid. [58]. 
90 ibid. [67]. 
91 ibid. [82]. 
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stating that he ‘substantially’ agreed with Laws LJ’s judgment. In his Lordship’s 
judgment, although the Schedule 7 stop was an interference with media freedom, the 
compelling national security interests engaged by the potential harm of the material in 
Miranda’s possession ‘clearly’ outweighed his enhanced journalistic rights under 
Article 1092. 
 
Finally, the court considered whether the Schedule 7 power, if used in respect 
of journalistic information or material, failed to be ‘prescribed by law’, pursuant to 
Article 10(2). Liberty, as interveners, argued that five principles could be derived 
from ECtHR jurisprudence on this point pursuant to Sanoma Uitgevers v the 
Netherlands 93 . The court rehearsed these principles 94 , which are also worthy of 
consideration here: 
 
‘First, the protection of journalistic sources must be attended with legal 
procedural safeguards commensurate with the importance of the Article 
10 principle at stake…Secondly, first and foremost among these 
safeguards is the guarantee of review by a judge or other independent and 
impartial decision-making body of any requirement that a journalist hand 
over material concerning a confidential source…Thirdly, the judge or 
other independent and impartial body must be in a position to carry out 
the exercise of weighing the potential risks and respective interests prior 
to disclosure. The decision to be taken should be governed by clear 
criteria…Fourthly, the exercise of an independent review that takes place 
only after the handing over of material capable of revealing such sources 
would undermine the very essence of the right to confidentiality and 
cannot therefore constitute a legal procedural safeguard commensurate 
with the rights protected by Article 10…Fifthly, however, in urgent cases, 
where it is impracticable for the authorities to provide elaborate reasons, 
an independent review carried out at the very least prior to the access and 
use of obtained materials should be sufficient to determine whether any 
issue of confidentiality arises, and if so, whether the public interest 
                                                        
92 ibid. [83]-[84]. 
93 [2011] EMLR 4 [88]. 
94 [2016] EWCA Civ 6 [100]. 
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invoked by the investigating authorities outweighs the general public 
interest in source protection.’95 
 
Thus, clearly the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court requires prior, or at the very 
least, in an urgent case, immediate post factum, judicial oversight of interferences 
with Article 10 rights in situations where journalists are required to reveal their 
sources. Without such oversight there are no sufficiently robust safeguards to render 
the interference with the right ‘prescribed’ by law. This is not surprising when 
considering the importance the ECtHR has attributed to the protection of journalistic 
sources pursuant to media freedom96. 
 
In relying on this jurisprudence, the court found that although Miranda’s case 
did not concern disclosure of a journalist’s source, there was ‘no reason in principle 
for drawing a distinction between disclosure of journalistic material simpliciter and 
disclosure of journalistic material which may identify a confidential source’97. The 
court held that it would be impractical to assume an average journalist would be able 
to obtain an emergency interim injunction following detention under Schedule 7. 
Further, post factum judicial review would not restore the confidentiality of sources or 
material. Consequently, in line with Sanoma, the court held that the legal safeguards 
in place to avoid the risk that Schedule 7 could be exercised arbitrarily were 
inadequate. Thus, the court determined that Schedule 7 was incompatible with Article 
10. The court noted that, while Strasbourg has not developed an ‘absolute’ rule of 
judicial scrutiny for such cases, some form of judicial or other independent and 
impartial scrutiny conducted in such a way as to protect the confidentiality in the 
material was considered the ‘natural and obvious safeguard against the unlawful 
exercise of…Schedule 7’98.  
 
It remains to be seen what the impact of the decision in Miranda will be on the 
operation of media freedom in circumstances that engage conflicting security 
interests. Although, the court was clear in its judgment that the decision of how 
                                                        
95 ibid. citing Sanoma Uitgevers v the Netherlands [2011] EMLR 4 [88]. 
96 See section 2 above. See also: Sanoma Uitgevers v the Netherlands [2011] EMLR 4 [88]-[92]; 
Nordisk Film & TV A/A v Denmark ([2005] App. no. 40485/02, 10. 
97 [2016] EWCA Civ 6 [107]. 
98 ibid. [114]. 
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safeguards to protect against the arbitrary use of Schedule 7 would be implemented 
would be left to Parliament, clearly the decision falls down in favour of free speech 
and media freedom principles and, in particular, the media’s right to protect the 
confidentiality of their sources. Indeed, the court emphasised the importance of these 
principles, as follows: 
 
‘The central concern is that disclosure of journalistic material (whether or 
not it involves the identification of a journalist’s source) undermines the 
confidentiality that is inherent in such material and which is necessary to 
avoid the chilling effect of disclosure and to protect article 10 rights. If 
journalists and their sources can have no expectation of confidentiality, 
they may decide against providing information on sensitive matters of 
public interest. That is why the confidentiality of such information is so 
important’99. 
 
Following the decision, the Home Office stated: ‘[i]n 2015 we changed the code of 
practice for examining officers to instruct them not to examine journalistic material at 
all. This goes above and beyond the court’s recommendations in this case.’100  
 
D. A VIEW FROM THE UK PART 2: THE TERRORISM ACT 2006 
 
As stated previously, the Terrorism Act 2006 also contains provisions that could 
impact upon the traditional media, as well as citizen journalists operating through 
social media101. For the purposes of media freedom, section 1, which relates to the 
encouragement of terrorism, and its allied provisions, are particularly pertinent. 
Although, as yet, there has been no jurisprudence in relation to the media’s interaction 
with these previsions, they are worthy of consideration at this juncture. 
 
Section 1 of the 2006 Act creates an offence of encouragement of acts of 
terrorism. The offence has been introduced to implement the requirements of Article 5 
of the CECPT. As stated above, this requires States to have an offence of ‘public 
                                                        
99 ibid. [113]. 
100 ‘Airport stop of Snowden reporter’s partner David Miranda ‘lawful’’, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-35343852 19th January 2016 accessed 13th May 2016. 
101 See fn 81. 
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provocation to commit a terrorist offence’102. The offence is committed if a person 
publishes, or causes a statement to be published, and either intends the public to be, or 
is reckless as to whether the public will be, directly or indirectly encouraged or 
otherwise induced by the statement (taken as a whole, including the circumstances 
and nature of its publication) to commit, prepare or instigate acts of terrorism or 
CECPT offences. Pursuant to section 1(5), the commission of the offence is not 
contingent upon the statement actually relating to an act of terrorism. Indeed, the 
offence can still be committed regardless of whether any body is actually encouraged 
or induced to commit, prepare or instigate an act of terrorism or CECPT offence. 
Section 20 provides a number of definitions relating to the section 1 offence. 
According to section 20(4) ‘publish’ includes a person disseminating a statement 
(which, pursuant to subsection (6), means any type of communication, including 
without words) in any manner to the public. This includes providers and users of 
services that can be accessed by the public electronically. Consequently, it captures, 
for instance, citizen journalism via social media and blogs, as well as traditional print 
and broadcast media platforms.  
 
Under Section 1(3) indirect encouragement of terrorism includes a statement 
that glorifies the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism or CECPT offences. 
However, this only applies if members of the public could reasonably be expected to 
infer that what is being glorified (which under section 20(2) includes praise or 
celebration) in the statement is conduct that should be emulated by them in existing 
circumstances. Section 20(7) clarifies that references to conduct that should be 
emulated in existing circumstances includes ‘conduct that is illustrative of a type of 
conduct that should be so emulated’. Thus, for example, if it was reasonable to expect 
members of the public to infer from a Facebook or blog post glorifying an attempted 
suicide bomb attack on the London Underground that what should be emulated is 
action causing severe disruption to London’s transport network, this will be caught by 
the section 1 offence.  
 
This offence could impact upon freedom of expression and media freedom, in 
situations where a person operating as media has disseminated statements that could 
                                                        
102 See section 3.B. 
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encourage or induce etc. terrorist activity. Section 1(6) provides limited protection for 
the media in these circumstances. It gives rise to a defence where it has not been 
proved that the publisher intended the statement to encourage or otherwise induce the 
commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism or CECPT offences. 
However, if the publisher is found to have acted recklessly in this regard, they cannot 
rely on the defence. In relation to citizen journalism’s facilitation of media freedom 
this could be problematic. Arguably, citizen journalists, that have perhaps not 
undergone the training associated with traditional journalism, and are less likely to 
have the same experience, resources and support at their disposal of, for instance, the 
print and broadcast media are, as a result, more likely to fall foul of having acted 
‘recklessly’ in their dissemination of information. Consequently, in the future, it is 
likely that we will see prosecutions of citizen journalists relating to their ‘reckless’ 
publication of material, contrary to section 1.  
 
For the defence to succeed the burden of proof rests on the defendant to show 
that: (i) the statement published neither expressed their views, nor had their 
endorsement, and (ii) that it was clear in all the circumstances of the statement’s 
publication that it was not their view and did not have their endorsement. Section 3 
can, in certain circumstances, add a further layer to the operation of the defence. It 
provides that a person cannot take advantage of the defence if they are deemed to 
endorse a statement because they have not complied, within two working days, with a 
notice, issued by a constable pursuant to subsection (3), to remove the statement from 
public view or alter it so that it is not related to terrorism. In situations where the 
defendant has complied with the notice, but the same or similar statement is posted 
again, they can still rely on the defence. In such a situation it may be difficult to tell if 
the statement is the statement to which the notice relates or a new one - a ‘repeat 
statement’. Indeed, subsection (4) provides that the person against whom the notice 
was issued will be regarded as having endorsed repeat statements. However, this is 
subject to subsections (5) and (6), which provide a mechanism to ensure that a person 
is only liable for statements that he knows about. These provisions determine that a 
person is not deemed to endorse a repeat statement if they can demonstrate that they 
have taken all reasonable steps to: (i) prevent such statements becoming available to 
the public; (ii) ascertain if the statement is available to the public; and (iii) they are 
not aware that the statement had been published or they were aware that it had been 
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published but they have taken every reasonable step to ensure it is removed or 
modified. The Act does not specify what reasonable means. This could create 
difficulties in the context of social media and citizen journalism where issues with 
‘speaker control’ means that a publication can be re-published and therefore re-
disseminated at an exponential rate103. As the defendant bears the burden of proof in 
this situation, to protect media freedom, and in particular the citizen journalist, what 
amounts to reasonable remedial steps should be determined on a case-by-case basis, 
taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the re-publication, how easy 
it is for the defendant to give effect to the section 3 notice and the efforts they have 
gone to in order to achieve this. 
 
This section has illustrated the myriad domestic provisions operating at the 
intersection between freedom of expression and terrorist activity. As the traditional 
‘Fourth Estate’ struggles, and citizen journalism, facilitated by social media, 
continues to go from strength to strength, it is likely that we will see an increase in 
cases where the activity of this new breed of journalist, operating as part of the media, 
potentially conflicts with the interests of national security and the security services in 
the name of freedom of expression and media freedom. Thus, the following section 
will consider the social media landscape, the diminishing fortunes of the traditional 
media, and the continued rise of citizen journalists. 
 
4. THE DEMISE OF THE TRADITIONAL ‘FOURTH ESTATE’ AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF CITIZEN JOURNALISM  
 
A. THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE REPORTING OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY 
 
Prior to the evolution of the Internet into a network available throughout the world 
and, in particular, the social media revolution, which transformed that network into an 
accessible form of mass media, that has facilitated the convergence of audience and 
producer 104 , traditional press and broadcast companies were the only media 
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institutions that had the ability to reach mass audiences through regular publication or 
broadcasts105. In contrast to the examples of high quality investigative public interest 
journalism provided by Leveson LJ’s Inquiry106, there is no doubt that, in recent 
years, an increasing number of traditional media outlets choose to engage with ‘sexy’ 
stories that sell, as opposed to reporting on matters of public concern107. As a result, 
the traditional media’s public watchdog role gradually diminished towards the end of 
the twentieth century and, instead, the focus has shifted onto commercially viable 
stories108. Media ownership, and the power derived from it, means that there is a 
constant conflict between the traditional media’s Fourth Estate role as a watchdog, or 
gatekeeper, and commercial reality. Indeed, during the twentieth century there has 
been a dilution of news media ownership, which is now vested in a relatively small 
number of large and powerful companies. Accordingly, this ownership concentration 
has had a detrimental affect on investigative journalism109, a role of the press and 
wider media that Lord Nicholls considered vital in Reynolds 110 . Indeed, large 
proportions of the traditional press and broadcast media facilitate ‘churnalism’, that is 
the regurgitation of existing stories from the same source, rather than engaging with 
sound investigative journalism as a result of, for instance, commercial pressures and 
restraints111.   
 
 The traditional media has, undoubtedly, being responsible for some exemplary 
work in relation to the investigative reporting of terrorist activity. For instance, Sky 
News was recently at the forefront of uncovering thousands of documents detailing 
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important information about Islamic State jihadis 112 . These ‘ISIS Files’ were, 
subsequently, passed on to the security services, and will clearly help to combat the 
extremist activity of Islamic State. To the contrary, a number of incidents relating to 
the reporting of terrorist activity, both within the UK and in the US, do not just 
animate the demise of the traditional media, but also expose its susceptibly to bias and 
‘churnalism’, based on commercial and political pressures. Further, they provide 
examples of conflict with the principles underpinning the Fourth Estate discussed 
earlier in this chapter.  
 
In Davies’ wide-ranging investigation into allegations of falsehood and 
propaganda in the media, he considers a number of ‘terror error’ stories published by 
the UK press in the wake of the London bombings in July 2005113. For example, 
before discovering that all four bombers were British-born, the Independent on 
Sunday blamed the attack on ‘white mercenary terrorists’114 whilst, according to the 
Sunday Telegraph, the perpetrators were ‘a foreign-based Islamic terrorist cell’115. 
The Times reported that the ‘the London rush-hour bombers are alive and planning 
another attack’116, before admitting that they were actually all dead. Indeed, according 
to Davies, Fleet Street newspapers identified four different ‘masterminds’ behind the 
bombings; the Daily Mail warned that a fifth terrorist was on the loose; and, after the 
failed attempt at bombings two weeks later, the Sunday Times reported that a third 
cell was in operation – all of which was later directly contradicted by the police and 
intelligence agencies117. Similar examples of ‘terror error’ stories were published by 
the US press after the 9/11 bombings - none of which turned out to be true. Instead, 
they were ‘pumped into the media by official sources who either genuinely did not 
know the truth or did not care but hoped for some political advantage’.118  
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This point is developed further in relation to the reporting in the US of 
terrorist activities relating to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. According to Davies: ‘[b]y the 
time he was killed in Iraq in June 2006, Zarqawi had become the most notorious 
Islamist fighter in the world, exceeding even Osama bin Laden in the scale of the 
killing which was attributed to him…We now know that a high proportion of what 
was said about Zarqawi was false’119. It transpired that the stories published about 
Zarqawi were the result of ‘strategic communications’ – information ‘campaigns’ by 
government agencies to strategically manipulate global perception of terrorist threats 
through the manipulation of a weakened traditional media prone to ‘churnalism’120.  
 
Similarly, a high profile example from the UK of the media (in this case the 
Sunday Times) publishing politically bias stories based upon ‘official 
communications’ from government agencies, that subsequently turn out to be false, 
relates to the notorious shooting by the SAS of members of the IRA in Gibraltar in 
1988. At 4:45pm on Sunday 6th of March the Ministry of Defence (MoD) released a 
statement that three suspected terrorists had been shot dead by security forces and that 
a ‘suspected bomb’ had been found. The MoD continued to provide off-the-record 
guidance to the media, which culminated in bulletins stating that the bomb was 
located in a crowded street and gunfire was exchanged between the terrorists and SAS 
personnel in an area containing civilians. To the contrary the three IRA terrorists had 
been shot dead by the SAS at 3:47pm. There had been no exchange of gunfire – as the 
security forces knew within minutes of the shooting – as none of the suspects carried 
any weapons. Further, by 7:30pm, at the very latest, the MoD knew there was no 
bomb. Despite this, misinformation continued to be fed to the media until 3:30pm the 
following day. 
 
From a Fourth Estate perspective, even more worrying than the MoD 
purposefully misinforming the media, was the now infamous reaction of the Sunday 
Times, which made no secret of its political partisanship - being allied to Margaret 
Thatcher’s Conservative government121. Rather than investigate the MoD’s actions 
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the newspaper returned to the MoD to acquire further information to produce a story 
headlined ‘SAS: Why we fired at IRA gang’. A further feature declared that this was 
‘another victory for Britain’s security services’ and reproduced, as fact, several 
passages of ‘highly contentious’ MoD briefing122. Following Thames Television’s 
Death on the Rock documentary, which presented key witnesses casting serious doubt 
on the ‘official’ story, the Sunday Times published an attack on the studio, supported 
by official guidance from the MoD. At this point, key Sunday Times reporters began 
to become concerned that the newspaper was intent on supporting the official MoD 
line, rather than considering any contradictory information, to the extent that they 
‘disowned’ the story123. However, the newspaper continued to publicly support the 
official line and attack Thames Television. Eventually, nine months after the initial 
story, the Sunday Times was forced to retract124. 
 
These incidents, and the way in which they were reported by the traditional 
media, are symptomatic of the challenges faced by, in particular, the press industry 
that is, not only subject to challenges posed by factors such as owner or political bias, 
but also by an extremely challenging financial climate, that has increasingly 
necessitated reporting and publishing decisions to be made based on commercial 
viability rather than adhering to the principles underpinning the Fourth Estate. 
Although this has, arguably, always been the case, it appears that ‘churnalism’ is on 
the increase, simply because of the costs involved with running a newspaper. Clearly, 
the traditional media is still an excellent source of valuable information and important 
investigative work. However, the independence associated with citizen journalism has 
amplified the fact that the traditional media can no longer always be relied upon to 
exercise its role as the public watchdog, through, for instance, conducting sound 
investigative journalism.  
 
The following section will consider the demise of the traditional Fourth Estate 
media, and how its role as the public watchdog is being usurped by an internet-based 
‘Fifth Estate’. 
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B. THE DEMISE OF THE TRADITIONAL MEDIA AND THE RISE OF CITIZEN 
JOURNALISM: A BRAVE NEW WORLD 
 
Citizen journalists, through the use of social media are, in many instances, replacing 
the traditional media as the public’s watchdog, consequently giving rise to what has 
been described as, an internet-based ‘Fifth Estate’125.  
 
Until relatively recently, the public were, to a great extent, limited as to what 
they were exposed to reading or seeing, by what large proportions of the traditional 
media chose to publish or broadcast. Such decisions may have come down to editorial 
control, based on, for instance, owner or political bias, commercial revenue, or both, 
rather than being based on the results of sound investigative journalism126. However, 
the emergence of social media, that has enabled citizen journalists to communicate 
with, potentially, millions of people, means that the ability to reach mass audiences is 
no longer something that is monopolised by traditional media institutions. Thus, 
social media platforms have changed the traditional media landscape forever, as they 
have altered our perceptions of the limits of communication, and reception of 
information. It is no longer the case that communication is constrained by boundaries, 
such as location, time, space or culture127 , or dictated by a media organisation’s 
ownership, political bias128 or commercial partners129. Access to multiple social media 
platforms twenty-four hours a day, that are instantaneously accessible, allows users, 
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forming what Benkler refers to as the ‘networked public sphere’130, to transmit and 
receive information to one and other, via ‘social networking sites’ (SNS), such as 
Facebook or Twitter, and ‘user generated content’ (UGC) platforms, that include 
YouTube, blogs and vlogs131, without the need to consider, what have become, the 
boundaries and restrictions mentioned above132. This is illustrated by using statistics 
to compare the use of social media with traditional media. For example, the New 
York Times 2013 print and digital circulation was approximately two million133 , 
enabling it to proclaim that it was the “#1 individual newspaper site” on the internet, 
with nearly thirty-one million unique visitors per month134. In contrast, YouTube, 
which is owned by Google, has one billion unique visitors per month 135  which, 
according to Ammori, equates to: “thirty times more than the New York Times, or as 
many unique visitors in a day as the [New York] Times has every month” 136 . 
According to WordPress’ statistics, it hosts blogs written in over 120 languages, 
equating to over 409 million users viewing more than 15.5 billion pages each month. 
Consequently, users produce approximately 41.7 million new posts and 60.5 million 
new comments on a monthly basis. As of December 2015, Twitter states that it has 
320 million active users137 and normally ‘takes in’ approximately 500 million Tweets 
per day, equating to an average of 5,700 Tweets per second138. It has more visitors per 
week than the New York Times does in a month139. Similarly, Tumblr hosts over 170 
million microblogs140 and, with 300 million visits per month, enjoys ten times more 
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than the New York Times141. According to Facebook, as of December 2015, it had 
1.59 billion monthly active users, 934 million of which use their mobile applications 
to access the platform on a daily basis142. Late 2013 saw Instagram’s global usage 
expand by 15%, in just two months, to 150 million people143. Latest figures show that 
this has now increased to 400 million144. LinkedIn’s current membership exceeds 400 
million145. These established platforms are only the ‘tip of the social media iceberg’. 
Pinterest continues to grow rapidly146, as do emerging platforms, such as Snapchat 
and WhatsApp147. Consequently, for many people, new media platforms have not just 
replaced the written word; they have become a substitute for the spoken word148. 
 
This ‘reach’ of social media amplifies the way that the media in general 
envelopes our existence. Traditional media organisations simply no longer 
monopolise the methods we use to find and facilitate news-gathering, communication 
or reception, or indeed how we express opinions and ideas. As a result, social media, 
and citizen journalism, has become an increasingly important source of news149. This 
is demonstrated by the available evidence relating to emerging trends in how news 
content is generated and disseminated in both the US and the UK In September 2012 
the Pew Research Centre published a report that analysed trends in news consumption 
by US citizens between 1991 to 2012150. The report confirmed that print newspaper 
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sales were declining 151 , and that a younger demographic of news consumers, 
comprising of adults under 30 years old, were turning to online and social media news 
sources, rather than television news. Indeed, between 2010 and 2012, the percentage 
of US citizens, across all age groups, receiving their news from social media, and in 
particular SNSs, increased from 9% to 19%. Accordingly, the report states that SNSs 
were the preferred source of news for 33% of the under-30s age group; with just of 
this group 13% obtaining their news from either the print or digital formats of 
newspapers. These figures are reflected in a more recent report from Pew152, which 
confirms that ‘millenials’ (persons born between 1981 and 1996) are most likely to 
obtain information about the 2016 presidential election via social media (Facebook is 
the most used platform, followed by Twitter and YouTube). The report states that of 
the 91% of all US adults who ‘learned’ about the election between the 12th to the 27th 
of January 2016, 14% claimed social media was the ‘most helpful’ source of 
information. Similarly, 13% claimed that news websites and mobile applications were 
the most helpful. However, in comparison, only 3% and 2% felt that local and 
national print newspapers respectively fell into the ‘most helpful’ source category.  
 
As Cram suggests, the Pew Centre’s figures are indicative of a broader trend 
outside the US and, significantly, in the UK153. Between March 2014 to March 2015 
average national daily newspaper sales fell by half a million –from 7.6 million to just 
over 7 million per day. During this period, The Daily Mail and The Times were the 
‘best performers’, but even they recorded significant losses in circulation. The Mail’s 
year-on-year circulation decreased by 4.7%, whereas The Times saw its sales decline 
by 0.9%154. According to the most recent Audit Bureau of Circulations’ (ABC)155 
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report, this overall decline is continuing, at a rather rapid rate. It suggests that the 
overall daily newspaper market is shrinking by more than 8% per year, and the 
Sunday market by a little over 9%, with daily and Sunday red-tops falling faster than 
the rest. In a year, the Sun, Daily Mirror and Daily Star have seen their circulation fall 
by more than 370,000, or 10.9%. The four Sunday red-tops (the Sun, Mirror, Star and 
People) have, collectively, seen a 12.3% decline in circulation since 2014; a fall in 
sales of 400,000. Broadsheets have not been immune to the fate suffered by the red-
tops. For instance, ABC statistics show that The Independent and the Guardian have 
suffered year-on-year decreases in circulation of 8.1% and 7.6% respectively156. 
 
The decline of the traditional media and the ascendency of social media has been a 
catalyst for the growth of citizen journalism, and the emergence of an online Fifth 
Estate. Indeed, the importance attributed to citizen journalism is demonstrated by this 
breed of journalist being officially recognised as press157. As Cram observes, these 
conditions have allowed social media and citizen journalism to transform: ‘…the 
average citizen’s hitherto largely passive experience of political debate led by elite 
opinion formers into something much more vibrant and more participative’158. Other 
scholars, who have made this democratisation argument 159 , have emphasised the 
empowerment 160  of what Volokh has referred to as ‘cheap speech’: ‘The new 
technologies…will, I believe, both democratize the information marketplace – make it 
more accessible to comparitively poor speakers as well as the rich ones – and 
diversify it’161. This ability of social media to create a democratised digital public 
sphere has also been acknowledged by the US Supreme Court in Reno v ACLU162, in 
which Justice Stevens stated that online chatrooms would enable anyone to become a 
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‘town crier with a voice that resonates further than it would from a soap box’163, a 
situation animated by the following examples. The death of Osama Bin Laden was 
leaked on Twitter, before being published by any newspaper164. Syria’s President, 
Bashar al-Assad, and his opposing rebels have distributed competing propaganda via 
Instagram165 . Chelsea Manning, the US soldier convicted in 2013 for, inter alia, 
offences pursuant to the Espionage Act, leaked classified documents to WikiLeaks, as 
opposed to a traditional media outlet166. The value of citizen journalism has been 
summarised by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, which stated:  
 
‘Citizens’ communication and interaction in online environments and 
their participation in activities that involve matters of public interest can 
bring positive, real-life, social change. When freedom of expression and 
the right to receive and impart information and freedom of assembly are 
not upheld online, their protection offline is likely to be undermined and 
democracy and the rule of law can also be compromised’167 
 
Despite the fact that, never before has a form of media changed the scale, pace 
or pattern of human affairs to such an extent, within such a short period of time as 
social media has, this section will conclude with a caveat. Although social media 
platforms are now a vital, and often the preferred method of imparting and receiving 
news168 , citizen journalism’s contribution to matters of public interest cannot be 
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overrated, just as traditional journalism should not be underestimated 169 . This is 
because social media can facilitate the instantaneous, and often spontaneous, 
expression of opinions and venting and sharing of emotions, thoughts and feelings170. 
Consequently, the internet is saturated with poorly researched, biased and 
meaningless material. For instance, in his Inquiry, Leveson LJ refers to Popbitch that, 
in his Lordship’s opinion, is: ‘clear in its ambition to entertain and understands itself 
to “poke fun” and comment on the “lighter” side of celebrity culture’171. 
 
Despite the best intentions of some serious citizen journalists, they may still 
lack the education, qualifications and experience to distinguish themselves from 
professional journalists. Indeed, bloggers post information despite being uncertain as 
to its provenance and without verifying it for reliability, and instead, rely on readers 
to judge its accuracy172. To the contrary, a blog by a professional journalist may 
include spontaneous comments and conversation, whilst being supported by 
professional experience and resources173. Ultimately, there exists a symbiosis between 
citizen journalism and the traditional media that has been articulated by a number of 
commentators. Essentially, this relationship is mutually beneficial because 
professional journalists and traditional media entities research and cover the findings 
of citizen journalism that, sequentially, adds credence to the citizen journalist’s work 
and facilitates the wider dissemination of their research174. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
It is clear from the prevailing sections that striking a balance between the interests of 
national security and freedom of expression and media freedom, particularly in the 
context of social media and citizen journalism is, and will continue to be, challenging. 
It remains to be seen what impact the ascendance of citizen journalism will have on 
some of the existing laws and principles relating to the dissemination of publications 
regarding national security and terrorism. Only time, and case law, may paint a 
clearer picture – if that is ever possible in a world where media is developing at such 
an incredible pace. It’s unlikely that the law will ever actually catch-up with today’s, 
let alone tomorrow’s, technology. Ultimately, we may always be faced with having to 
‘make-do’ with a ‘square-peg-round-hole’ regime. Consequently, in order for an 
appropriate balance to be struck, those operating at the intersection of these interests 
and rights must ensure that they remain attuned to, not only the complex laws that 
govern this area, but also the constantly evolving social and media environment. 
